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NOTES
Communications Law: Differential Taxation of the
Media: Leathers v. Medlock: Prejudicial or Profitable?
I. Introduction
Today, the First Amendment' and taxation are rarely associated with one
another. However, concerns over taxation gave birth to the doctrines protected by
the First Amendment.' The American Revolution began, in part, because of
British governmental stamp duties imposed on newspapers These so called
"taxes on knowledge" prompted the Framers of the Constitution to provide for
freedom of speech and for freedom of the press in the First Amendment.5
While the press is not insulated from taxation under the First Amendment,6
taxes imposed must be equitably applied' and generally applicable' to various
enterprises. Since the inception of the Constitution, a complete and comprehen-
sive standard regarding equal taxation of the press has evaded the United States
Supreme Court.
This note focuses on the current approach taken by the Supreme Court on
media taxation. First, the background and facts surrounding Leathers v. Medloc?
will be examined. Second, the Leathers opinion and its constitutional repercus-
sions will be analyzed. Third, the possible effects of Leathers on Oklahoma
media taxation policies will be considered. Finally, this note concludes that
Leathers is not consistent with the prior decisions on media taxation. In fact,
Leathers provides a vehicle for the government to discriminate at will.
II. Development of Media Taxation
A. The Trilogy of Media Taxation Cases
Throughout history, taxes and licenses have impeded the press.'" However, not
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no laws respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
2. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 248 (1936).
3. Id. at 246-48.
4. Id. at 246.
5. Id. at 246-48.
6. Id. at 249,
7. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 5; PA. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
8. See, e.g., Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990); Citizens
Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (antitrust laws); Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act); Mabee v. White Plains
Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act).
9. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
10. See, e.g., City of Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark Publishing Co., 28 S.E. 959 (Va. 1898); Cowan
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
until Grosjean v. American Press Co." did the United States Supreme Court
address whether differential media taxation" is constitutionally valid under the First
Amendment. 3 Specifically, Grosjean questioned the validity of a tax directed at
the larger newspaper; in Louisiana, while providing exemptions for the smaller
newspapers. 4 The Louisiana legislature imposed the tax to suppress certain
viewpoints." The Court in Grosjean declared the tax unconstitutional because it
was deliberately directed at stifling particular ideas. Consequently, the Court left
undecided whether mere differential media taxation provided separate grounds to
strike down the tax.
Where Grosjean stopped, Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue 7 continued. The tax reviewed in Minneapolis Star was
a generally applicable use tax" because it applied to numerous enterprises for the
privilege of using, storing, or consuming tangible personal property in Minnesota. 9
However, the tax exempted the first one hundred thousand dollars worth of ink and
paper consumed annually by a publication." The exemption resulted in eleven
publishers, producing fourteen of the 388 paid circulation newspapers, incurring the
entire burden of the ue tax.
2'
v. Fairbrother, 24 S.E. 212 (N.C. 1896); In re Jager, 7 S.E. 605 (S.C. 1888).
I1. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
12. Differential media taxation occurs when a tax is placed on one part of the media but not the
entire media. The discrimination that results is manifested in two different forms: intramedia discrimin-
ation or intermedia discrimination.
Intramedia discrimination refers to a tax that discriminates within a particular information medium,
such as newspapers, broadzast television, radio, magazines, or cable television. A tax producing
differential intramedia taxation would tax a group of newspapers for example differently than other
newspapers, or tax some magazines differently than other magazines.
Intermedia discrimination refers to a tax that discriminates between different information media. A
tax producing differential intermedia taxation would tax magazines for example differently than broadcast
television, or tax cable television differently than newspapers.
13. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 242-43.
14. Id. at 240-41.
15. The tax originated -s an attempt by Sen. Huey Long (D.-La.) to control the large newspapers.
MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVD A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAW 125 (4th
ed. 1990). Two percent of the gross receipts on advertising sold by newspapers with a weekly circulation
of 20,000 or more were subject to the tax. Id. Oddly enough, only 13 of the 124 newspapers in the state
suffered from the tax, and 12 of those opposed Senator Long's views. Id. Therefore, Long proposed the
tax to the legislature as "a tax on lying." Id.
16. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250.
17. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
18. This is important because a tax that is generally applicable to a variety of enterprises is not
viewed as discriminatory and will not trigger the highest standard of constitutional review, strict scrutiny.
A generally applicable tax normally falls under a rational basis test for constitutional analysis.
19. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 578 (1983).
20. l. at 578.
21. Id. Despite the fact that the tax was generally applicable to numerous enterprises, the Court
followed a strict scrutiny analysis because the tax produced a discriminatory result for newspaper
publishers.
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The result in Grosjean was attributable, at least in part, to an improper, censorial
legislative motive." Because the tax scheme in Minneapolis Star lacked any
improper legislative motive, the Court distinguished Grosjean.
The Minneapolis Star Court decided to reevaluate the approach used in addressing
differential media taxation issues.' The Court concluded that illicit legislative
intent need not be the driving force behind differential media taxation before a First
Amendment violation occurs.' The Court reasoned that an analysis on the
constitutionality of differential media taxation begins with a presumption that the
tax is unconstitutional s The Court's rationale stemmed from a fear that unequal
taxation on the media would serve as a censor, stifling particular ideas or view-
points
In Minneapolis Star, the Supreme Court held that singling out the press for
differential treatment under a general tax, or singling out individual members of the
press for taxation, requires the State to assert "a counterbalancing interest of
compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation"' before
the tax can be held constitutional. Finally, the Court held, on independent grounds,
that the tax was unconstitutional because the effect of the exemption singled out a
small number of speakers."
The United States Supreme Court in Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland"
subsequently addressed a sales tax scheme that discriminated between magazines
and newspapers (different media) as well as among magazines (the same medium).
The Arkansas statute provided a tax exemption for (1) newspapers; (2) religious,
professional, trade, and sports journals; and/or (3) publications printed and published
within the state' The result of the sales tax left some magazines burdened by a
tax, while other magazines were freed by the exemption. The case presented a
similar dilemma as Minneapolis Star. differential taxation of similarly situated
media (intramedia discrimination).
However, the Court in Arkansas Writers' Project faced a more disturbing use of
selective taxation than the Court in Minneapolis Star.' Arkansas legislators
allowed exemptions on certain magazines based on the publication's content. As a
result, the Court determined that the tax discriminated on the basis of content and
declared the tax unconstitutional under the First Amendment 3
22. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
23. FRANKUN & ANDERSON, supra note 15, at 126.
24. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 580.
25. Id. at 592.
26. Id. at 585.
27. Id.
28. lid
29. IM at 591-92. A speaker refers to a single "voice" within the media, such as the New York
Times.
30. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
31. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224 (1987).
32. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 233.
1993]
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Arkansas Writers' Project also reviewed a second form of discrimination. The
Arkansas tax scheme provided exemptions for newspapers but not for certain
magazines (intermedia discrimination). Choosing not to focus on the differential
taxation between Arkmsas' magazines and newspapers (intermedia discrimination),
the Supreme Court accordingly declined to address whether differential taxation
between different types of media (intermedia discrimination) provided a basis for
invalidating the tax.'
B. The Nondiscrimination Principle
The trilogy of media taxation cases discussed above established the nondiscrimi-
nation principle. 5 Under this principle, differential media taxation is constitutional-
ly suspect and must be struck down unless it is justified by a special characteristic
of the medium or the state offers a counterbalancing compelling interest so
important that the interest cannot be achieved without differential taxation.' When
dealing with an issue on differential media taxation, a court generally begins its
analysis presuming the tax is unconstitutional, and the State has the burden to justify
the tax?
7
III. Facts of Leathers v. Medlock
The adoption of Act 18838 created the controversy reviewed in Leathers. Act
188 amended Arkansas' Gross Receipts Ac 9 to include the sale of cable television
services within the purview of the state sales tax. However, exemptions from the
amended sales tax still existed for newspapers, magazines, and satellite broadcast
services,4 thereby resulting in differential media taxation.
A trio4' joined together to fight the inequality resulting from Act 188. The group
filed a class action suit to challenge the constitutionality of the tax extension to
cable television services." The United States Supreme Court set out to resolve the
34. Id
35. This principle expresses the government's general First Amendment obligation not to interfere
with the press as an institution. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 449 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233 (1936). But see Leathers v. Medlock, 449 U.S. 439 (1991).
38. 1987 ARK. AcTs 188, § 1.
39. Arkansas' Gross Receipts Act levies a 4% tax on receipts from the sale of all tangible personal
property and specified services. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 26-52-301, -302 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989). The
Gross Receipts Act exempts the sale of certain goods and services from taxation. Id. § 26-52-401
(Michie Supp. 1989). Under this Act counties impose a further 1% tax on the same goods and services.
Id. §§ 26-74-222, -307 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1989). Cities may also tax the same goods and services
an additional .5% or 1%. Id. § 26-75-307 (Michie 1987).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. §ff 26-52.401(4), -401(14) (Supp. 1989).
41. The trio consisted of Daniel Medlock, a cable subscriber, Community Communications Co., a
cable television operator, anJ the Arkansas Cable Television Association, Inc., a trade organization
comprised of Arkansas cable system operators.
42. The Arkansas Chanc-.ry Court first heard the dispute. The cable petitioners argued their services
[Vol. 46:713
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss4/6
NOTES
question left open in Arkansas Writers' Project: Does the First Amendment prevent
a state from imposing a tax on only select media?
IV. Opinions of Leathers v. Medlock
A. The Majority Opinion
The Court in Leathers declared that Act 188 constituted the extension of a
generally applicable sales tax43 to cable television services." Based on the above
finding, the Court made four conclusions. First, the tax scheme did not single out
cable television in particular; therefore, the watchdog function of the press was not
hindered.4 Second, the Arkansas legislature failed to show a propensity towards
censorship of cable television. Third, the tax focused on a large enough number
of cable operators, thereby preventing the risk to the Constitution similar to content-
based regulation.47 Fourth, the free exchange of ideas was not stifled by the tax."'
The majority thus concluded that none of the First Amendment concerns presented
in Grosjean, Minneapolis Star, or Arkansas Writers' Project were present in
Leathers.49 As a result, Act 188 did not violate the First Amendment.'
Finding Leathers outside the scope of the previous decisions on media taxation,
the majority addressed the constitutionality of the media taxation issue presented
are protected by the First Amendment, like the services of the newspapers, magazines and satellite
broadcast services that were exempt from the GRA tax. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 442 (1991).
The petitioners contended their rights were violated by the differential tax treatment of Act 188 under
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 442-43.
The chancery court concluded the use of the public rights-of-way distinguished the cable operators
from other media. Id. The chancery court held this distinction supported the disparity in the taxation
produced by Act 188, and the act was constitutionally upheld. Id.
Shortly after the chancery court issued its decision, Arkansas adopted 1989 ARK. ACTS 769, § 1 (Act
769). Id. Act 769 extended the GRA tax to include the distribution of television, video or radio
transmissions with or without the use of wires. Id. at 1441-42. In effect the exemption for the satellite
broadcast services was abolished.
The cable petitioners appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court continuing to challenge the
constitutionality of Act 188, despite the adoption of Act 769. Id. at 1442. However, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reasoned, ipse dixit, that the Constitution does not prohibit the differential taxation of
different media. Medlock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ark. 1990). Although, the Arkansas
Supreme Court considered differential taxation of the same media unconstitutional. Id.
43. The services taxed included: natural gas, water, electricity, ice, and steam utility services;
telephone, telecommunications, and telegraph service; the furnishing of rooms by hotels, apartment
hotels, lodging houses, and tourist camps; alteration, addition, cleaning, refinishing, replacement, and
repair services; printing of all kinds; tickets for admission to places of amusement or athletic,
entertainment, or recreational events; and fees for the privilege of having access to or use of amusement,
entertainment, athletic, or recreational facilities. ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-52-301 (Michie Supp. 1989).
44. Leathers v. Medlock, 449 U.S. 439, 453 (1991).
45. L at 447.
46. Id. at 448.
47. Id. at 448-49.
48. Id. at 453.
49. Id. at 449.
50. Id. at 453.
19931
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with three cases not involving media taxation issues: Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Wcshington,5" Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 2 and
Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling.3 The Leathers majority relied on these three
cases to support its holding that differential taxation of selected media is, by itself,
insufficient to raise First Amendment concerns.4
Citing Regan,55 the majority stated that a tax scheme that discriminates among
speakers does not implicate the First Amendment unless it discriminates on the basis
of ideas.56 The government need not exempt speech from a generally applicable
tax.' Regan announced that a tax scheme does not become suspect simply because
it exempts only some speech. 8
The majority gained further support by relying on Mabee and Oklahoma Press.
While those cases did not involve taxation, each did involve governmental action
that placed differential burdens on the press. 9 In both cases, the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 provided an exemption for smaller newspapers, which the
larger newspapers argued was an unconstitutional, differential burden that violated
the First Amendment.' The exemption was upheld because there was no indication
that the government had singled out the press for special treatment,61 or that the
exemption was a "deliberate and calculated device" to penalize a certain group of
newspapers.'
Taken together, Regan, Mabee, and Oklahoma Press establish that differential
taxation of speakers, including the media, does not implicate the First Amendment
unless "the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular
ideas." ' The tax schemes in Grosjean, Minneapolis Star, and Arkansas Writers'
Project resulted in threats to particular ideas or viewpoints; consequently, the First
Amendment was implicated. 4 However, the tax reviewed in Leathers lacked any
threats to particular ideas or viewpoints because it applied to a broad range of
51. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
52. 327 U.S. 178 (1946).
53. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
54. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 453.
55. In Regan, a nonprofit, nonmedia organization brought suit after it was denied tax exempt status
for its lobbying activities. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 541-42
(1983). The Court viewed tax exemptions as subsidies that are administered by the tax system. Id. at
544. The key issue in Regam was not whether the plaintiff must be permitted to lobby, but whether
Congress was required to provide the plaintiff with public money to support the plaintiffs lobbying
activities. Id. at 551.
56. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 450.
57. Id. at 451 (citing Cannarano v. United States 358 U.S. 498 (1959)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 452.
60. Id. 452-53.
61. Id. at 452 (citing Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 194 (1946)).
62. Id. at 452-53 (quoting Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946)).
63. Id. at 453.
64. a L
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services.' The Arkansas legislature simply chose to exclude certain media from
a generally applicable tax.'
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the First Amendment prohibits singling out a particular
information medium for tax burdens not borne by other media.67 A nondiscrimina-
tion principle, which was established by the previous media taxation cases, should
have been the basis for invalidating Arkansas' tax scheme.' Because cable
operators compete in the information market with the print, electronic, and broadcast
media, the power to discriminate between the different media raises concerns
underlying the nondiscrimination principle: the risk of covert censorship. 9
Justice Marshall asserted, "The nondiscrimination principle protects the press
from censorship prophylactically, condemning any selective-taxation scheme that
presents the 'potential for abuse' by the State . . . independent of any actual
'evidence of an improper censorial motive."''" The potential that the government
could abuse its taxing power to prevent the free exchange of ideas justifies the
condemnation of a selective tax scheme under the nondiscrimination principle.
V. Analysis of Leathers v. Medlock
A. Threats to Suppress Expression
"There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas' and government must afford
all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard."7' The majority in Leathers
at best overlooks this fundamental proposition, and at worst ignores it. The decision
handed down in Leathers fails to adequately protect an underlying First Amendment
concern, the free marketplace of ideas.n
The result in Leathers offends equality. The First Amendment protection granted
to the press includes cable television. "The First Amendment guarantees freedom
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 454 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 454-55.
69. Id. at 458.
70. Id. at 458 (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) and Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228 (1987)).
71. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
72. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., the Court stated:
The preservation of a full and free flow of information to the general public has long been
recognized as a core objective of the First Amendment to the Constitution. It is for this
reason that the First Amendment protects not only the dissemination but the receipt of
information and ideas.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the First
Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered
out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
73. See Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488,494 (1986) (stating that cable
19931
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of the press - not just the printed press."'74 The Leathers decision allows segrega-
tion of the media and applies differential, discriminatory taxation to a particular
information medium, cable television."
The Court in Leathers relied on Regan for the proposition that the power to
discriminate in taxation is inherent in the power to tax. 6 However, if the trilogy
of media cases provided stand for anything, it is that the government cannot
discriminate when taxing the media." Protection of individual views is paramount
to protecting the First Amendment.'
The risk of the government selectively favoring one medium and taxing another
violates the principles established in the First Amendment." The basis behind
taxing the media with equality is preserving the dissemination of information to the
public through an unfettered marketplace of ideas. Selective taxation provides a tool
for the government to suppress particular viewpoints.' "An unlimited power to tax
involves, necessarily, a power to destroy; because there is a limit beyond which no
institution and no property can bear taxation."'" If the government is allowed to tax
cable operators differently than other media, then the government would have the
potential to destroy cable television.
The tax scheme in Leathers may apply to a wide range of services making it a
generally applicable tax, which usually proves valid under constitutional scrutiny. 2
However, the tax is not generally applicable to the media. Act 188 provides
exemptions for newspapers and magazines but not for cable television services.
Based on the trilogy of media taxation cases this should be considered unconstitu-
tional.'
operators deserve the same First Amendment Protection as newspapers and magazines).
74. Oklahoma Broadcaters Ass'n v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Okla. 1990).
75. Leathers v. Medloek, 499 U.S. 439, 454 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 451.
77. Id. at 464 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,765 (1976); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64,77 (1964); New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-70 (1964).
79. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. MeCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
82. If a tax is considered generally applicable then the First Amendment is not implicated.
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commn'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581 (1983).
83. The Minneapolis Star Court stated:
A power to tax diffemntially, as opposed to a power to tax generally, gives a government
a powerful weapon against the taxpayer selected. When the State imposes a generally
applicable tax, there is little cause for concern. We need not fear that a government will
destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation if it must impose the same
burden on the rest of its constituency.
Id. at 585.
84. "This Court has long recognized that the freedom of the press prohibits government from using
the tax power to discriminate against individual members of the media or against the media as a whole."
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 454 (1991) (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936)); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983). "The Framers of the First
[Vol. 46:713
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Three dangers exist that may suppress information making the trilogy of media
cases applicable. First, Act 188 hinders the watchdog function of the media.' The
newspapers and magazines exempt from Act 188 remain unhindered to serve their
checking function on the government.' These publications are free to speak out
against the government without fear of retaliation in the form of raised taxes.'
Cable television services, however, fall under Act 188. Therefore, cable operators
become subject to greater governmental control, which is an unconstitutional
result."
Second, the threat of content-based regulation exists by allowing an exemption
for newspapers and magazines, but not cable television.' Cable television provides
services, including Spanish-language information networks, religious programming,
and broadcasts of local city council meetings, all of which remain unavailable
through other mediaY° The tax borne by cable television, and not other media,
risks affecting these cable specific views, which stifles or distorts the free
marketplace of ideas in a manner akin to content-based discrimination' A tax
discriminating on the basis of content will trigger a heightened scrutiny under the
Amendment, we have explained, specifically intended to prevent government from using disparate tax
burdens to impair the untrammeled dissemination of information." Id.; see also Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 518, reh'g denied 358 U.S. 860 (1958) (holding the discriminatory denial of tax exemptions
can impermissibly infringe free speech).
85. The Minneapolis Star Court stated:
When the state singles out the press, though, the political constraints that prevent a
legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are weakened, and the
treat of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That threat can operate as effectively as a
censor to check critical comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our
political system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government.
Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
86. "The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse, and a tax limited to the press
raises concerns about censorship of critical information and opinion." Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,
447 (1991).
87. In Whitney v. California, Justice Louis Brandeis stated:
[O)rder cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies
in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies;...
Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities .... the Constitution [was
amended] so that free speech ... should be guaranteed.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
88. In Cohen v. California, the Court stated:
The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us ... in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
89. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 461.
91. Id. at 462.
1993]
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First Amendment.' Reviewing Act 188 under a heightened scrutiny reveals the tax
scheme is unconstitutional.
Third, the tax creates an unfair economic market in which the media compete for
the public's attention. The tax levied on the cable operators will probably be passed
on to the consumers or subscribers of cable television. Arguably, the increased
subscription fee could result in a decreased market share for the cable companies.
Cable subscribers may be outraged at the increased rates and cancel their subscrip-
tion; or cable subscribers may be unable to afford the increased rates and be forced
to cancel their subscription. Regardless, Arkansas cable operators become
disadvantaged by the unequal tax, which could possibly lead to the unconstitutional
result of decreased dissemination of views to the public.93
B. Special Characteristics Justifying Taxation
States have an obligation to treat the media equally.' Since the United States
Supreme Court has previously recognized that differential taxation within" an
information medium interferes with the market of ideas by imposing costs
disproportionately, logic dictates that the same conclusion apply to differential
taxation across" different media. The same interference to the market of ideas
results from both situations."
Special characteristics of a medium may justify imposing disproportionate taxes.
However, the state must offer a compelling reason under the nondiscrimination
principle to justify a differential tax9 Cable television must use public rights-of-
way to distribute its signal. Arguably, use of city streets could qualify as a "special
characteristic" justifying differential taxation. However, cable operators must pay
a franchise fee to the city,' and in Arkansas, the fee is expressly designed to
defray costs associated with cable's use of any public rights-of-way.'"
The only justification given by Arkansas for the differential tax on cable was
raising revenue.'' Raising revenue, however, is not considered a compelling
reason to overcome the presumption that a tax is unconstitutional.'
If the Leathers Court had made the wiser choice and followed the nondiscrimina-
tion principle, Act 188 would have been considered unconstitutional. The Court
could have either removed the exemption and applied the tax evenly to all media
92. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-31 (1987).
93. Subjecting the media to competitive disadvantages violates the First Amendment "command
that the government.., shall not impede the free flow of ideas." Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
94. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 458.
96. IL
97. Id. at 458-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 454-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'n of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983)).
99. 47 U.S.C.A. § 542 (West 1992).
100. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 459 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. Id
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or provided an exemption for cable services. Since Arkansas was interested in
raising revenue, the profitable choice would have been removal of the exemption.
Instead, Arkansas chose the prejudicial path of unjustified differential taxation.
C. Problems with Applying the Leathers Decision
1. Classification
Even if the Leathers decision is accepted, the problems associated with its
application make it unworkable. One problem with the holding in Leathers is the
difficulty of placing the press into categories, which must occur if differential
intermedia taxation is to be successful. The majority fails to provide any guidance
for placing different media into defined groups: How many groups should there be?
What are the qualities of a medium that subject it to one category over another?
Since complete answers to the questions raised by Leathers were not provided,
enlightenment from future courts will be necessary to clarify when permissible
"classification" becomes impermissible "targeting. '1 3
2. Scope
The dissent points out another problem: The majority's approach supplies no
guidance to the scope of the Leathers decision." When a generally applicable tax
applies selectively to the media, the First Amendment is only offended if the tax
affects a small number of speakers within a medium.' Solely under those circum-
stances does selective taxation resemble a penalty for particular ideas." The
majority's "small versus large" test rests on the theory that a tax levied on a large
number of cable operators offering a wide variety of programming throughout
Arkansas would not pose the risk of affecting a limited range of views." The
majority's reasoning begs review.
An intermedia tax scheme was constitutionally upheld because "enough" cable
operators were being taxed. Whether a million cable operators are taxed or only
one, the danger of preventing the dissemination- of information remains when the
media are segmented and differential treatment results. In fact, the greater the
number of cable operators taxed under Act 188 increases the chances that cable
specific views will be affected.
The tax may never actually affect the cable operators' abilities to provide the
public with information. This is irrelevant. What is relevant is the potential for a
103. Walter Hellerstein, Supreme Court Settles Some Tax Issues While Creating Other Problems,
75 J. TAX'N 180, 183 (1991).
104. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 448-49.
106. Id. at 449.
107. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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"chilling effect!' on the dissemination of information provided by cable opera-
tors. Therefore, differential media taxation cannot be tolerated.
Furthermore, an inference exists in the majority opinion that the First Amendment
is offended when three speakers within a medium are taxed;"w but, taxing one
hundred speakers withn a medium fails to trigger First Amendment problems.'
In other words, three is a "small" enough number to warrant First Amendment
protection from taxation while one hundred is "large" enough to forego protection.
The majority suggests that a line exists which separates the sheltered from the
vulnerable. However, the majority fails to articulate where the line for First
Amendment protectioa should be drawn. Maybe the Constitution should be
rewritten on an Etch-A-Sketch. Then, the Supreme Court could continue to divide
the First Amendment providing lines of arbitrary protection. If the Court wanted to
draw lines, it should have provided a bright line and ruled that either intermedia tax
discrimination is constitutional or unconstitutional. The wiser choice would have
been to declare differential taxation of the media unconstitutional.
3. Future Application
The fundamental nature of First Amendment principles demand that standards
provide clear, unambiguous direction for consistent application.' Leathers
presented the Court with an opportunity to resolve an issue that had evaded review.
However, the Court bypassed its chance to provide a clear, broad standard that
would completely resolve the issue at bar. Consequently, many questions were left
unresolved."' The effect of the Leathers decision leaves an unnecessary burden
on future courts."3
The Court should have provided a per se rule to subsequently enable courts to
resolve similar issues easily. The cases following Leathers are nothing short of
baffling"" because of the inconsistent approach on differential media taxation
issues."
15
108. "The deterrent effect of governmental action that falls short of a direct prohibition against the
exercise of First Amendment rights. To constitute an impermissible chilling effect the constrictive impact
must arise from the present or future exercise or threatened exercise of coercive power." BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 240 (6th ed. 1991).
109. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 448.
110. Id.
111. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 235 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. For example, the Leathers court failed to address whether differential taxation of members of
the same medium could violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 571 N.E.2d 617, 622 n.1 (Mass. 1991).
113. Helerstein, supra note 103, at 183.
114. Id.
115. Compare Globe N.wspaper Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 571 N.E.2d 617, 622 (Mass. 1991)
(recognizing the Leathers decision, but failing to apply it to a tax treating newspaper publishing
differently than all other manufacturing enterprises) with Galacher v. Comm'r of Revenue Servs., 602
A.2d 996, 1005 (Conn. 1992) (following Leathers and concluding that exempting newspapers from the
generally applicable use tax while not exempting other media does not violate the First Amendment) and
Sacramento Cable Television v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 3d 232, 241,286 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475-
76 (1991) (following Leathers and holding that the extension of a state's generally applicable sales tax
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Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of America Inc.,.16 for example,
illustrates problems applying the Leathers decision. The Florida legislature imposed
a sales tax on magazines while exempting newspapers."" The discriminatory
nature of the tax prompted a lawsuit."' The Florida Supreme Court struck down
the newspaper exemption."1 9 Consequently, the media were taxed equally."
This, however, violated the legislature's intent to provide an exemption for newspa-
pers.
2'
Shortly after the Leathers decision, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
Florida Supreme Court's judgment, remanding it for consideration pursuant to
Leathers." As a result of the vacated judgment, Florida's tax administrators were
uninformed on the steps they should take."2 Leathers presented a dilemma:
Should the Department of Revenue follow the mandate of the Florida Supreme
Court and collect a tax from the newspapers, violating legislative intent; or should
the Department refuse to enforce the tax, violating the Florida Supreme Court's
decision?" Regardless of the Florida tax administrators' decision, the problems
with applying the Leathers decision remain for future tax administrators and
legislators."
D. The Danger of the Leathers Decision
The Court in Leathers set out to resolve the question of whether a tax scheme
discriminating between different media is constitutional. By failing to provide a
definitive answer to this question, the Court allowed the possibility for the
government to discriminate at will. After Leathers, legislators have the potential to
tax a particular medium, while excluding other media, provided the tax is a
generally applicable tax and the number in the medium being taxed is considered
"large" enough.
The government cannot be allowed to influence the process by which its citizens'
preferences for information formats evolve."2 Leathers demonstrates the Court's
unwillingness to grant full First Amendment protection to cable television, a
relatively new medium. Questions remain concerning even newer communications
technologies, such as multipoint multichannel distribution services (wireless cable),
to cable television, while exempting the print media, does not violate the First Amendment).
116. 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
117. Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of Am., Inc., 565 So. 2d 1304, 1304-05 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
118. Id. at 1304-05.
119. Id. at 1310.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Helerstein, supra note 103, at 183.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Iowa Dept of Fin. & Revenue, 461 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1990);
Newsweek, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. 1990); Southern Living, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d
251 (Tenn. 1990).
126. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 465 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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direct broadcast satellite, satellite master antenna television, and electronic
publishing. When the viewpoints offered through these new technologies offend
legislators or their constituents, Leathers provides a vehicle for governmental
regulation."v
VI. Effects of Leathers v. Medlock on Oklahoma Media Taxation
Dow Jones v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" illustrates Oklahoma's application
of the nondiscrimination principle to media taxation issues. Dow Jones and
Company, Inc. publish and distribute the Wall Street Journal. Most of the
publications are sold by subscription and delivered by mail."r Dow Jones
challenged the constitutionality of an Oklahoma use and sales tax scheme that
allowed a tax exemption for publications costing less than seventy-five cents and
for publications that are not delivered by mail. 3 The exemption resulted in
differential treatment of the media since publications costing more than seventy-five
cents or publications delivered by mail were not exempt from the tax.
Relying on Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Project3' the Oklahoma
Supreme Court struck down the inequitable media tax scheme." The Oklahoma
court placed the burden of proof on the state and held when the burden cannot be
met, a ruling must favor the taxpayer.'33
In order to remedy the differential flaw in the statutory scheme, the Dow Jones
court moved to rescind the tax instead of extending an exemption to the previously
discriminated media." However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized that
nothing would prevent the legislature from reenacting the tax without the unconstitu-
tional exemption.'
One year previous to the Leathers decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Oklahoma Broadcasters v. Oklahoma Tax Commission" reviewed a differential
intermedia tax scheme. The court, in Oklahoma Broadcasters, applied the
nondiscrimination principle.
The Oklahoma Broadcasters Association (corporations and partnerships licensed
to broadcast in television and radio), Griffin Television Inc. (an Oklahoma
Corporation broadcasting as KWTV), and Gentry Broadcasting Inc. (an Oklahoma
Corporation engaged in radio broadcasting as KGVE), sought a declaratory
127. Tax exemptions may not "afford latitude to government officials to pass judgment on the
content and quality of an applicant's views and, therefore, to discriminate against those engaged in
protected First Amendment activities." 16B CJ.S. Consitutional Law § 608 (1985) (citing Big Mama
Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
128. 787 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1990).
129. Dow Jones v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843, 843-44 (Okla. 1990).
130. Id. at 844.
131. Id at 845.
132. Id. at 847-48.
133. Id at 847.
134. Id. at 847-48.
135. Id. at 848.
136. 789 P.2d 1312 (Okla. 1990).
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judgment in an Oklahoma district court. The three wanted the following issue
settled: whether a tax structure that exempts some, but not all, of the media from
use and sales taxes impermissibly burdens the rights protected by the First
Amendment. 37 The tax structure in question provided exemptions for publishers
while not providing similar exemptions for broadcasters.'
Finding the tax invalid under the nondiscrimination principle, 3 ' the Oklahoma
Broadcasters court decided the best way to rectify the constitutionally invalid tax
was not to extend the exemption to the broadcasters, but to repeal the tax.'" The
court stated in dicta that the Oklahoma legislature may decide to modify the tax
code without imposing differential burdens on the media. 4'
Differential treatment of the media remains in one area of the Oklahoma tax
code. Ad valorem taxes applying to manufacturing facilities currently provide an
exemption for newspapers while neglecting to provide exemptions for other
media.
41
Following Oklahoma Broadcasters and Dow Jones, Oklahoma should strike the
exemption for the newspapers. However, Leathers arguably abandons the
nondiscrimination principle relied upon by Oklahoma, allowing differential tax
treatment of the media. Should Oklahoma, in light of Leathers, rethink its approach
to media taxation issues?
Oklahoma's state constitution provides for equality of taxation among the "same
class of subjects."'43 Dow Jones and Oklahoma Broadcasters illustrate Oklahoma's
view that the different medium that make up the media are the same class of
subjects. Accordingly, Oklahoma courts, despite the Leathers decision, should strike
down any tax scheme treating the media differently.'" Any judiciary or commen-
tator should not fault a state for adhering to the mandate of its constitution and
highest court.
VII. Conclusion
By nature, the tax collector searches for every opportunity to tax. Alternatively,
the taxpayer seizes every exemption possible. Consequently, conflicts arising from
differential taxation of the media may appear a natural struggle. However, First
Amendment concerns exist. Therefore, the struggle shifts from being between the
taxpayer and the tax collector to a struggle between the free speaker and the speech
regulator.
137. Oklahoma Broadcasters Ass'n v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Okla. 1990).
138. Id. at 1314-15.
139. Id. at 1317-18.
140. Id. at 1317.
141. Id. at 1317-18.
142. See 68 OKLA. STAT. § 2902 (Supp. 1993).
143. OKLA. CONS-. art. 10, § 5.
144. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 571 N.E.2d 617,621-22 (Mass. 1991)
(illustrating the striking of a differential media tax scheme after Leathers).
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Arkansas asserted raising revenue to justify its tax. The state wanted to profit
from the delivery of information to the public, but such a tax scheme can only be
viewed as prejudicial. By allowing the government to exempt select media from a
generally applicable tax, the Leathers court has established a vehicle for at-will
discrimination.
Leathers is clearly a victory for those who seek governmental regulation of the
press. The threat of such suppression of information tears against the fabric of the
First Amendment.
Jeffery T. Graefe
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss4/6
